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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Women have the right to terminate their pregnancies,1 although it is neither 
absolute nor free from numerous attempts to be abolished or to be significantly 
limited.2 Attempts to regulate pregnancy have also affected women’s rights to make 
decisions concerning the refusal of medical procedures.3 In In re Brown,4 the Illinois 
court appointed a guardian to protect the interests of a fetus and ordered a pregnant 
woman to undergo a blood transfusion against her will.5 In 2004, Melissa Rowland 
refused to undergo a cesarean section. Doctors claim that her refusal resulted in the 
stillbirth of one of her fetuses.6 She became the first pregnant woman arrested for 
homicide because of her behavior during pregnancy.7  
                                                                
1  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2 See generally Human Rights Watch, U.S. Abortion Regulations Undermine Women’s 
Right to Choose, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/27/usdom14469.htm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2006). 
3 Id. 
4 In re Brown, 689 N.E. 2d. 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
5 SHEENA MEREDITH, POLICING PREGNANCY 45 (Ashgate 2005) [hereinafter Meredith]. 
6 See Monica Miller, Refusal to Undergo a Cesarean Section: A Woman’s Right or A 
Criminal Act? 15 HEALTH MATRIX 383, 400 (2005) [hereinafter Miller]. 
7 Id. at 383. 
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State courts vary in their willingness to protect pregnant women’s rights to self-
determination, bodily integrity, privacy, and religious freedom; these rights are 
sometimes outweighed by fetal rights to live.8 Different state courts have issued 
many competing decisions, which emphasizes a lack of unification in this area of 
law.9 This inconsistency in the law creates confusion for women concerning the 
scope of their legal protections and alters women’s selection of prenatal care and 
decision to give birth. Thus, it is important to recognize the prevailing themes and 
grounds on which courts have rested their opinions.  
An analysis of these state court rulings will expose a lack of unification among 
states’ interests in protecting either women’s rights or fetal rights. This article will 
first identify the factors that courts have used in their rulings; these are the factors 
that judges most often have used to support or limit pregnant women’s constitutional 
rights. A psycho-legal analysis then examines the effects of inconsistent rulings on 
women, the medical profession, and the law. The concluding section will provide 
recommendations for pregnant women and offer policy suggestions. 
II.  FACTORS INFLUENCING LEGAL RULINGS 
A number of recent court cases emphasize inconsistencies in the law concerning 
pregnant women’s rights and fetal rights.10 Some courts recognize fetal rights at 
viability,11 whereas other courts sustain a mother’s overriding right to refuse any 
medical treatment during the entire pregnancy.12 Fetal rights are based on the state’s 
compelling interest to protect human life, especially at viability, and on recognition 
of a fetus as a person under particular state laws.13 Most state courts reference the 
provisions of Roe v. Wade14 that refer to “viability” as the point at which the state has 
a compelling interest in protecting fetal rights to live and be born healthy.15 Not all 
courts, however, have referred to the point of viability as the premise for their 
                                                                
8 See generally In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), reprinted 
as an appendix to In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y. 
S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
9 See generally Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E. 2d 355 (Ill. 1988) (ruling in favor of the 
mother’s right to refuse medical treatment); In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (ordering a 
pregnant woman to undergo a cesarean section). 
10 See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that a 
pregnant woman’s right to refuse a medical treatment is absolute); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul 
Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Morgan, 201 A.2d. 537 (N.J. 1964) (articulating that the state’s 
interest in protecting a viable fetus outweighs a mother’s right to refuse medical treatment).  
11 See Nold v. Binyon, 31 P.3d 274 (Kan. 2001); People v. Taylor, 32 Cal. 4th 863, 883 
(Cal. 2004). 
12 In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. at 332, following Stallman, 125 Ill.2d at 223 (this 
rationale refers to pregnant women’s right to refuse invasive medical treatment which does not 
diminish during pregnancy). 
13 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 391. 
14 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
15 Meredith, supra note 5, at 41. 
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rulings.16 In a few cases, the judges noted the state’s compelling interest in protecting 
the life of a not-yet-viable fetus.17  
The prevailing factors on which courts rest their holdings about pregnant 
women’s rights to refuse medical treatment can be grouped into categories based on 
common themes. Identifying these themes will emphasize the factors on which 
courts base their opinions and how these opinions affect pregnant women’s rights 
and fetal rights. These factors include self-determination, bodily integrity, privacy, 
free exercise of religion, and the protection of a woman’s health and life. The 
remainder of this section will focus on each of the major factors that judges have 
relied on in their rulings. 
A.  Pregnant Women’s Right to Self-Determination and Bodily Integrity 
A right to control one’s body is an issue of one’s autonomy, and typically the 
state is not allowed to interfere in these intimate, personal decisions.18 The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the right to bodily 
integrity.19 A right to self-determination is protected under the common law,20 and it 
is supported by the doctrine of informed consent.21 Individuals have a right to refuse 
to subordinate their rights to the rights of others, even in order to save another 
person’s life.22 This provides a competent adult with the right to refuse to consent to 
any medical treatment being performed on him or her.23  
Courts that have heard cases concerning the pregnant woman’s right to refuse 
medical treatment have discussed such rights.24 Several courts established the legal 
importance of a pregnant woman’s rights to self-determination and refusal of an 
                                                                
16 See generally Mark Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 L., MED., 
AND HEALTH CARE 114-129 (1989) [hereinafter Field]. 
17 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 837, 846 (1992); In re 
Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
18 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) 
(discussing individuals’ constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
19 The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in section 1, states:  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
20 See Meredith, supra note 5, at 6. 
21 Id. at 7. 
22 See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d. 90 (Allegheny Cp. Ct. 1978) (opining that an 
individual is not obligated to undergo a medical procedure to benefit another person). 
23 See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
24 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. 457 (Ga. 1981); 
In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), reprinted as an appendix to 
In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. 326 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1994) 
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invasive medical treatment based on the “reasonable man” standard.25 The 
“reasonable man” standard originated in the development of the common law.26 This 
standard concerns the ability of an individual to act sensibly (e.g., making a 
reasonable decision whether to undergo a medical procedure).27 Pregnancy does not 
prevent women from adhering to this standard; thus, pregnant women have the full 
capacity to make decisions for themselves, including the decision to refuse or 
consent to any medical treatment. 
This approach is reflected in the court ruling in Mercy Hospital v. Jackson.28  In 
this case, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals denied a hospital’s request for 
appointment of a guardian for a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness who refused a blood 
transfusion during a cesarean section.29 The court’s reasoning was based on a 
competent individual’s right to bodily integrity. Similarly, in In re Baby Boy Doe, 
the judge ruled that a woman’s right to refuse an invasive medical procedure, such as 
a cesarean section, does not diminish during pregnancy; thus it is absolute.30  
The right of a pregnant woman to self-determination was the focus of the In re 
Brown case.31 In this case, a pregnant woman lost a lot of blood during surgery; the 
doctors recommended a blood transfusion, but she refused.32 The trial court ordered 
the transfusion to be administered, but the appellate court ruled differently, 
articulating that the state may not overrule a competent woman’s decision to refuse 
medical treatment in order to save the life of her fetus.33 The judge also stated that a 
blood transfusion is an invasive medical procedure that interferes with bodily 
integrity.34  
Some courts have even noted that pregnant women do not face civil liabilities for 
hurting their fetuses.35 The court in Stallman v. Youngquist enunciated the right of a 
pregnant woman to reject medical treatment, even if it will result in jeopardizing her 
health and life, and the life and welfare of her fetus.36 In this case, the Illinois 
Supreme Court refused to recognize a mother’s liability for prenatal injuries to her 
                                                                
25 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d. 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing the 
“reasonable man” standard for informed consent). 
26 See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 E.R. 490 (C. P. 1837). 
27 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (Pocket Ed. 3rd 2006) (defining a “reasonable 
person” as one who “acts sensibly”).  
28 Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d. 1130, 1134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
29 Id. at 1134. 
30 See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d. at 326. 
31 In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d. at 398-99, 404-05. 
32 Id. at 398. 
33 Id. at 400. 
34 Id. at 405. 
35 See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988). 
36 Id. at 356. 
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fetus.37 The court reasoned that such claims would expose mothers to unreasonable 
state scrutiny and would violate the right to bodily integrity.38 
In contrast, the Washington, D.C. court in In re A.C. reached the opposite 
conclusion regarding a pregnant woman’s right to refuse invasive medical 
treatment.39 There a young woman was pregnant when doctors discovered that her 
cancer had returned. She became seriously ill before the fetus was born. Although 
some of the doctors doubted that the child would live and predicted that a cesarean 
delivery will hasten the mother’s death, the court ordered the cesarean surgery in an 
attempt to save the child.40 The child died within two hours after the delivery, and the 
mother died two days later.41   
These few examples illustrate the inconsistencies among states. The obligation of 
a pregnant woman to comply with doctors’ advice to undergo a particular medical 
treatment conflicts with her right to self-determination and bodily integrity. Courts 
disagree as to whether the pregnant woman’s rights or the rights of the fetus should 
prevail.42 This is the same situation for women’s right to privacy. 
B.  Pregnant Women’s Right to Privacy 
A pregnant woman has a fundamental right to privacy under Canterbury v. 
Spence and Stallman v. Youngquist.43 In some cases of pregnant women rights to 
privacy, state courts have issued opinions based on the Ninth Amendment.44 
Although the Constitution does not articulate the right to privacy, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut determined that this right is one of the 
“unenumerated” rights protected by the Ninth Amendment.45 The Griswold Court 
emphasized the significance of the right to privacy concerning individuals’ decisions 
to bear a child.46  
Some pregnant women have refused medical treatment based on the right to 
privacy.47 In Taft v. Taft,48 the Massachusetts Court of Appeals disregarded a lower 
                                                                
37 Id. 
38 Id. (basing its rationale on a pregnant woman’s right to privacy, self determination, and 
religious freedom). 
39 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1235, 1237 (D.C 1990). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re A.C., 573 A.2d. at 
1235. 
43 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d. 772, (D.C. Cir. 1972); Stallman, 531N.E.2d. 355 
(rejecting the perspective that pregnant women’s rights are subordinated to fetal rights); Alan 
John Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 39 
CREIGHTON L. REV 849 (2006) [hereinafter Cohan]. 
44 
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const. amend. IX. 
45 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
46 Id. 
47 See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. 457 (Ga. 1981). 
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court’s order that required a woman in her fourth month of pregnancy to undergo an 
invasive medical procedure.49 The Court held that there were no compelling 
circumstances to justify overriding her right to privacy.50  
In other cases, judges have overruled pregnant women’s rights, declaring that the 
fetal rights to live and to be born healthy outweigh the mother’s rights.51 For 
instance, the court in In re A.C. chose not to uphold the incompetent woman’s right 
to privacy (against the dissent’s objections) and instead determined that the decision 
could be made by a guardian who could be appointed to make the decision whether 
the procedure should be performed.52 As the dissent points out, overruling the 
mother’s wishes potentially violated her privacy rights.53  
Some appellate courts have overruled lower courts’ decisions to force a woman 
to undergo medical procedure. For instance, the Taft court vacated a lower court’s 
decision, finding that forced medical procedures violate the mother’s privacy.54 Even 
though the courts recognize the importance of individuals’ right to privacy, they 
sometimes significantly limit this right for pregnant women.55 Another restricted 
right is the right to freely exercise one’s religion. 
C.  Pregnant Women’s Right to Free Exercise of Religion 
When a competent adult declines medical treatment on religious grounds, the 
courts generally respect his or her wishes, even in a life-or-death situation.56 
However, if a state can demonstrate a compelling interest that would justify 
overriding the right to free exercise of religion, a court may limit this constitutional 
right. At the point of fetal viability, the state’s interest becomes compelling, thus a 
judge may overrule a pregnant woman’s right to freely exercise her religion.57  
A host of cases have considered a pregnant woman’s right to free exercise of 
religion.58 In some instances, the woman’s religious rights have prevailed. The court 
in Mercy Hospital v. Jackson came to such a conclusion.59 In this case, a pregnant 
                                                          
48 Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d. 395 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. 457; In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 
(D.C. 1987). 
52 See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1235, 1258. 
53 Id. at 1248 
54 Taft,446 N.E.2d.395. 
55 See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235. 
56 See Miller, supra note 6, at 387. 
57 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Miller, supra note 6, at 389. 
58 See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Morgan, 201 A.2d. 537 (N.J. 
1964). 
; In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).; Nold v. Binyon, 31 P.3d 
274 (Kan. 2001); Taft, 446 N.E.2d. 395. 
59 Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d. 1130, 1134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
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woman with the signs of premature labor agreed to a cesarean delivery, but she 
refused to have a blood transfusion due to her religious beliefs.60 Although the 
hospital tried to obtain a court order to administer the procedure, the judge said that a 
competent adult has a right to refuse a blood transfusion based on religious grounds, 
if it will not endanger the fetus.61 
In contrast, some courts have refused to honor the woman’s religious rights. In 
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Morgan, a pregnant woman 
refused a blood transfusion due to her religious beliefs.62 The lower court refused to 
intervene, but the Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the transfusion to save the 
lives of both the mother and the fetus.63  In In re Jamaica Hospital, the court ordered 
a blood transfusion to save the lives of a mother and her not-yet-viable fetus, 
disregarding the woman’s religious objections.64 Similarly, in Crouse Irving 
Memorial Hospital v. Paddock, a pregnant woman agreed to a cesarean section but 
refused a blood transfusion based on her religious beliefs.65  The court ordered the 
mother to receive blood transfusions as necessary for the survival of her fetus, 
despite her objections.66  
In the majority of cases, courts have significantly limited a pregnant women’s 
Constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.67 Even those state courts which 
issued opinions protecting pregnant women’s religious right have added stipulations 
that a pregnant woman’s religious freedom may be respected if it does not conflict 
with endangering her fetus.68 Consequently, the right to free exercise of religion is 
neither absolute nor well protected. 
D.  Pregnant Women’s Right to Protect Their Health and Lives 
Pregnant women who consent to a cesarean section assume numerous health risks 
associated with this procedure. Cesarean birth is a major surgery that may result in 
infection of the bladder or kidneys, increased blood loss (twice as much as with 
vaginal birth), decreased bowel functions, respiratory complications, and maternal 
death. A cesarean section also presents possible complications to the infant, such as 
premature birth, breathing problems, injury during the delivery, and infant lung 
immaturity. This procedure is also associated with a longer hospital stay and 
recovery time for women. There are long-term risks, too. For instance, the incision 
scar could break open during a later pregnancy or labor. In addition, the placenta 
                                                                
60 Id. at 1134. 
61 Id. 
62 See Raleigh, 201 A.2d. at 537. 
63 Id. 
64 See In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d at 898-99; see also generally Cohan, supra note 
43. 
65 Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1985). 
66 Id. at 443, 445. 
67 See Raleigh, 201 A.2d. 537; In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y. S.2d. 898; Crouse Irving, 485 
N.Y.S.2d. 443. 
68 See, e.g., Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d. at 1130, 1134. 
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could sink too low in the uterus and block the cervix, causing severe bleeding after 
childbirth or necessitating a hysterectomy. In short, a cesarean section presents some 
serious threats to a woman’s health. 
Pregnant women’s rights to protect their own health and life precede the fetal 
right to live, as outlined in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists and in Stallman v. Youngquist.69 In Thornburgh, the court offered 
strong support for the mother’s right to refuse a risky medical procedure for the sake 
of her fetus.70 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that the 
statute providing for the protection of the life of a fetus before a woman’s health was 
unconstitutional.71 Similarly, in Stallman, the court said that if a procedure would 
compromise the health of the mother, the court will not overrule her refusal to 
consent.72 A mother’s rights are superior to the rights of a fetus, and a woman’s 
health cannot be subordinated to the state’s interest in preserving the potentiality of a 
viable fetus.73 
Some courts have forced invasive medical treatments on pregnant women, 
ignoring the possible complications that could result in pregnant women’s loss of 
life, health, psychological well-being, and self-worth.74 These court decisions were 
based only on medical evaluations, which were not always accurate.75 The 
inaccuracy of doctors’ diagnoses is demonstrated in cases such as In re Madyun and 
In re Jamaica Hospital.76 In In re Madyun, the doctors stated that there was a big 
chance of a fetal infection through a vaginal delivery, but after the forced cesarean 
section was performed, there was no infection found.77 Obstetricians were also 
incorrect in their diagnoses in Jefferson and In re Baby Boy Doe.78 In both cases, the 
babies were born healthy, contrary to the doctors’ predictions that the babies would 
die or be seriously harmed if they were not delivered through cesarean section.79 In 
these cases, the pregnant women’s health was unnecessarily put at risk. 
                                                                
69 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69 
(1986) (prohibiting the state from placing restrictions on abortions); Stallman v. Youngquist, 
531 N.E. 2d 355 (Ill. 1988). 
70 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69. 
71 Id. at 768-69. 
72 See Stallman, 531 N.E. 2d at 333, 355. 
73 Id. at 333, 355. 
74 See generally Field, supra note 16. 
75 See Miller, supra note 6, at 398; Meredith, supra note 5,at 64. 
76 See In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), reprinted as an 
appendix to In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d 
898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
77 See Meredith, supra note 5, at 65. 
78 See e.g., Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth, 274 S.E.2d. at 460 (the woman checked 
out of the hospital and later gave birth to a healthy child to the contrary of the doctors’ 
diagnoses); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. at 326. 
79 See generally Miller, supra note 6. 
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Generally, state courts favor protecting pregnant women’s health. However, 
courts have different opinions on how particular medical treatments may pose health 
risks and how necessary they are to the delivery of a baby.80 When courts perceive 
that a medical procedure, such as a blood transfusion or a cesarean section, presents 
a minimal risk to the health of a pregnant woman, the judges order the treatment 
despite the woman’s objections.81  
E.  Fetal and State Rights 
The state has a compelling interest in protecting the potentiality of human life, 
including the right of a viable fetus to be born alive and healthy. Many state courts 
have protected the state’s interest because they determine that a fetus deserves the 
state’s protection.82 Some courts have ruled that beyond the legal period of time 
allowed for abortion, the state automatically has the power to protect the life and 
health of a woman’s fetus.83 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the court has ruled that 
the state has an interest in protecting the potentiality of human life from 
conception.84 Thus, a pregnant woman’s rights are often balanced with the rights of 
the fetus or of the state. 
III.  “BALANCING” THE RIGHTS OF A WOMAN AND THE FETUS 
When determining the rights of the woman, the fetus and the state, courts have 
used different rationales and have issued different decisions.85 Some courts have 
emphasized the importance of applying a balancing test to determine whether a 
pregnant woman can refuse an invasive medical procedure.86 In some cases, the 
judges have articulated that in order to protect the life or health of a fetus, a cesarean 
section or a blood transfusion is the least invasive procedure to be imposed on 
pregnant women.87 In In re Madyun, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia 
authorized the imposition of an invasive medical treatment over the wish of a 
pregnant woman.88 The court determined that fetal rights and a pregnant woman’s 
                                                                
80 See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747; In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d. at 898; Griffin 
Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. at 457. 
81 See, e.g., In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), reprinted as 
an appendix to In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Brown, 689 N.E. 2d. 397 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
82 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
83 See Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
84 Id. at 837. 
85 See, e.g., Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d. at 460; Pemberton v. 
Tallahassee Mem’l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d. 1247, 1251 (N.D. Fla. 1999).; In re Baby Boy 
Doe, 632 N.E. 2d. 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
86 See id.  
87 See generally In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), 
reprinted as an appendix to In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1259 (D.C. 1990); In re Jamaica 
Hosp., 491 N.Y. S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
88 In re Madyun, Misc. No. 189-86. 
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rights were not in conflict, despite the mother’s objections.89 The court also 
characterized a cesarean section as a minimal risk to the mother in comparison to a 
high risk to the fetus.90  
Essentially, when recognizing the right of a pregnant woman to accept or reject 
any medical procedures, courts have held that this right is not absolute.91 In a few 
cases, the right of a pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment has been judicially 
overridden.92 The court may either protect a pregnant woman’s rights or find that 
they are outweighed by the state’s compelling interest in protecting the right of a 
fetus to live.93 In Jefferson, the court held that the intrusion into the life of a mother 
is outweighed by the duty of the state to protect a viable fetus from death.94  In In re 
Jamaica, even though the state’s interest was not compelling because the fetus was 
not viable, the court emphasized the significance of the state’s interest in protecting 
the life of a fetus.95 In In re A.C., the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld 
an order permitting doctors to perform a cesarean section on a pregnant terminally ill 
woman based on the interest of the fetus, and it expanded the scope of permissible 
intrusion into pregnancy.96  
Other state court considered the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Stallman v. Youngquist, holding that a woman’s right to decide is more important 
than fetal interests, and courts should not balance the maternal rights and fetal 
rights.97 Perhaps Thornburg presents the strongest support for a pregnant woman’s 
refusal of an invasive medical treatment.98 In this case, the court issued an opinion 
supporting the superiority of a mother’s rights over the fetal rights by striking down 
portions of an abortion law which required risking a mother’s health, by requiring a 
certain type of abortion to be performed, to protect the fetus.99 
As illustrated by these examples, the state courts have made a variety of opinions 
concerning the rights of women to refuse medical treatment. Some courts have 
determined that the women’s right is absolute, while other courts have concluded 
that the woman’s rights are outweighed by the rights of the fetus or the state. Even 
when courts find in favor of the mother, they rely on many different rationales, 
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including the right to bodily integrity, right to religion, and the right to protect one’s 
health. This variety of rulings has a number of effects. 
IV.  THE EFFECTS OF STATE COURT RULINGS 
Court rulings have a number of effects on women, the medical system, and the 
legal system. One serious consequence of court-ordered treatment is that pregnant 
women may avoid the health care system, and thus will receive inadequate prenatal 
care.100 For instance, a Jehovah’s Witness may decide to avoid going to a doctor for 
fear that he or she will force her to have a blood transfusion or surgery that would 
violate her religious beliefs. The lack of prenatal care may result in many 
complications during pregnancy and childbirth, especially for women at-risk for 
pregnancy and childbirth difficulties.101   
Some women may make medical decisions based on their doctor’s willingness to 
force them to undergo medical procedures. For instance, a woman may learn that her 
regular doctor is likely to seek legal assistance to force her to undergo medical 
treatment, and she may decide to change doctors to avoid this outcome. 
Unfortunately, changing doctors may mean that the woman has to travel a great 
distance or pay for medical care not covered by her insurance. Women may receive 
significantly delayed, more expensive, and more time consuming prenatal care if 
they are forced to shop for a doctor that will not force them to have procedures 
which they find objectionable. 
Some women are not afforded the ability of shopping for a doctor that will honor 
their beliefs; sometimes women do not find out that their doctor plans to force 
medical treatment on them until the issue comes up, such as when the doctor decides 
a woman needs the medical treatment immediately. By this time, the doctor likely 
will have sought the help of the courts to force a woman’s compliance, making it too 
late for her to change doctors. Various state courts have ruled differently on the issue 
of forced medical treatment. As a result, pregnant women are often unsure what 
impact the law will have on their rights if they refuse an invasive medical procedure.  
Cases arise under very different circumstances, leading to a variety of bases for 
challenging the court order. Some courts have sided with the women, protecting their 
rights to self determination, bodily integrity, privacy, free exercise of religion, and 
health and life.102 Other courts have found that fetal rights or state interest outweighs 
the mothers’ rights.103 A series of high-profile court cases have emphasized that 
states are divided on this issue, which creates a problem for mothers, who do not 
know what their rights are until a judge makes a ruling in a particular case. 
Judicial intervention in pregnancy may also deprive women of their most basic 
civil rights and threaten their recognition as competent individuals with the ability to 
make their own treatment decisions.104 The legal control of pregnant women may 
place all women of childbearing age at risk for governmental regulation of their 
                                                                
100 See M. L. Poland, J. W. Ager, & J. M. Olson, Barriers to Receiving Adequate Prenatal 
Care, 157 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 297, 303 (1987). 
101 Id. at 303. 
102 See Infra Section II. 
103 See infra Section II.E. 
104 See generally Field, supra note16. 
290 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 22:179 
behavior.105 It also poses a threat of creating a new class of individuals—pregnant 
women—who are considered incompetent to make their own treatment decisions.  
Frequently, judicial holdings have limited pregnant women’s constitutional 
rights, and have regulated their freedom in making prenatal care choices.106 This may 
have an impact on women’s reproductive health (e.g., cesarean sections may have 
side-effects) and result in jeopardizing the life of the fetus (e.g., if the mother does 
not seek prenatal care for fear of being forced to undergo an objectionable 
procedure). The court rulings will also affect the medical system’s ability to care for 
patients. Court rulings forcing women to have treatments may alienate women and 
make them unwilling to turn to the medical profession. Court-ordered medical 
procedures may alter the physician-patient relationship by creating distrust of 
pregnant women toward their doctors. Mistrust may lead the woman to be unable to 
confide in her doctor about her medical issues which could risk her health and her 
fetus’ health. She may also refuse to follow her doctor’s advice if she does not trust 
the doctor. Clearly, doctors can care for their patients better when there is a positive 
doctor-patient relationship. 
Court orders may also create a potential conflict between medical personnel 
which could affect the quality of care they provide. One of the pregnant woman’s 
doctors may support forcing the woman to have a particular medical procedure, but 
other medical staff, such as the anesthesiologist or nurses, may not agree. If the court 
orders the procedure, many medical personnel must be involved. This would force 
some medical personnel to be active in a medical procedure they would not agree 
with; almost certainly this would create hostility among hospital staff. Thus, the 
debate affects the medical profession and its ability to care for patients. 
As these examples illustrate, court rulings can affect pregnant women and the 
medical profession. In order to avoid some of these negative outcomes, changes in 
policy are necessary. 
V.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As this analysis demonstrated, there is much disparity among court opinions 
concerning the rights of pregnant women. Consequently, most women cannot be sure 
of their rights, which could be confusing and stressful. Knowing the possibility of 
forced medical treatment can have negative effects, such as avoidance of prenatal 
care. Nevertheless, there are steps that can be taken to reduce the impact on women. 
Some researchers propose that pregnant women should discuss the issue of 
possible refusal of any invasive medical treatment with their doctors.107 Early in their 
pregnancies, women could sign necessary forms supporting their wishes to decline 
an unwanted medical treatment before any crisis that might occur. Doctors should 
notify patients of their willingness, or lack thereof, to force women to undergo 
medical treatments. This would allow them to find a different doctor who would not 
force them to undergo a cesarean section or a blood transfusion if their own doctor 
would not respect their preferences.108  
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Unfortunately, not all women could be so proactive. Socio-economic 
disadvantages, which prevent some women from accessing prenatal care, may not 
allow them to voice their refusal of medical treatment in the delivery room. If a 
pregnant woman refuses to consent to an invasive medical procedure upon delivery, 
consents are sometimes obtained through court orders. In effect, doctors administer 
cesarean sections or blood transfusions, and women can only appeal these judicial 
decisions after the procedures have been already performed.109 Women who are in 
hospitals do not always have the time to prepare a legal defense to protect their 
rights, and they are often surprised that a doctor would not honor their refusal to 
consent. Thus, it is unfair to surprise pregnant women with a legal dispute while they 
are involved in a medical crisis. Although they can appeal the order later, it is too 
late; the procedure has already been performed. Thus, instead of allowing emergency 
orders, hospitals could take proactive steps to inform pregnant women of their rights 
before a crisis arises. 
Hospitals could establish specific guidelines for doctors and women. The policies 
would clearly state the conditions, if any, on which doctors are allowed to seek court 
orders to force women to have treatments against their will. The hospitals could also 
inform pregnant women of their policies as early in the pregnancy as possible so 
women can choose the hospital with a policy they accept. Doctors and other medical 
personnel would also be able to choose a hospital that has policies consistent with 
their personal preferences. For example, doctors who are willing to force a woman to 
have medical treatment could seek employment at hospitals that allow them to seek 
court orders. Such policies would prevent conflict created by the sudden court 
proceedings. 
States could adopt specific statutes to outline the rights of pregnant woman, 
giving women notice of their rights during pregnancy. Specific guidelines could 
indicate under what circumstances pregnant women can or cannot refuse an invasive 
medical treatment. Doctors and hospitals would give pregnant women this 
information as early in the pregnancy as possible so women could be better 
informed. These guidelines could also save the society the money spent on costly 
litigations and allow pregnant women to avoid emotional and physical distress 
during their pregnancies. An unfortunate limitation of this policy could occur if a 
state adopts policies that do not support the women’s rights. Pregnant women in this 
state would be forced into difficult decisions: should they continue to see their 
doctors and risk being forced to undergo an unwanted treatment? Should they avoid 
prenatal care and deliver the baby at home? Should they travel to another state that 
has more favorable laws? Nonetheless, having specific laws would allow women to 
know their rights and make decisions accordingly. 
Finally, the federal government could issue a national referendum concerning 
women’s rights during pregnancy. A national law is unlikely, as states are generally 
allowed to make their own guidelines regarding such issues. A national committee 
would consult the American Medical Association and other medical bodies for 
guidance as to what policies are most medically sound. The U.S. Supreme Court 
could agree to hear a case of forced medical treatment to determine whether the court 
order infringed on a woman’s Constitutional rights. A Supreme Court ruling would 
provide the ultimate ruling about whether a hospital can force a pregnant woman to 
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have a medical procedure. Until such time, the other policies will help women make 
the best personal decisions. 
These policy suggestions would be beneficial in a number of ways. Women 
would be informed of their rights and be able to make informed choices concerning 
their medical care. They would avoid any emotional discomfort that accompanies the 
uncertainty of not knowing their rights. Medical personnel could make employment 
decisions based on the hospital’s policies; this would reduce the chances of being 
involved in an uncomfortable situation. Sudden court battles and costly litigations 
could be avoided. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As indicated in a number of cases, state courts vary in their opinions concerning 
the protection of pregnant women’s rights. If the life or well-being of a fetus is 
endangered, the court may authorize a medical treatment regardless of a pregnant 
woman’s objections or preferences. Some courts perceive the mother’s 
Constitutional rights as absolute whereas other courts subordinate these rights to fetal 
rights.110 Some courts have forced pregnant women to undergo invasive medical 
procedures, such as a cesarean section or a blood transfusion, when the life of a 
viable fetus was endangered.111 Some courts have determined that the surgery should 
be carried out because it is a relatively invasive procedure.112 In many cases, judges 
have issued rulings based on the state’s compelling interest in protecting the life of a 
fetus.113 In contrast, courts that have protected pregnant women’s rights have 
determined that a mother’s rights are absolute.114 In some instances, judges 
characterized a blood transfusion as an invasive medical procedure that should not be 
forced.115 
Discrepancy among state court rulings does not provide any guidelines for 
pregnant women whether the law protects their constitutional rights or overrides 
them. Court-ordered invasive medical procedures may alter women’s lives to a great 
extent. Pregnant women may avoid prenatal care which can jeopardize the health and 
life of both the mother and the fetus. In order to avoid forceful medical treatments, 
pregnant women may have to access costly medical out-of-insurance care or travel a 
great distance. Forced medical treatment may also negatively affect the patient-
provider relationship by creating mistrust.  
This article provided an analysis of pregnant women’s rights to refuse invasive 
medical treatment based on inconsistencies among different state laws and different 
state court rulings. Most state courts issued their opinions on a case-by-case basis 
which contributes to the inconsistency. This discrepancy creates chaos in the law and 
inflicts unnecessary suffering upon pregnant women. The policy suggestions offered 
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here should help reduce the inconsistency for women, the medical profession, and 
the legal profession. Women will be certain of their rights, and doctors will be 
certain of their efficacy to force treatments. As a result, the negative outcomes 
discussed here can be reduced. 
 
 
 
